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APPLICATION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DOCTRINE
The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press."' While this seems to be an ex-
tremely clear prohibition against any sort of regulation, experience
tells us it has not been so read, or so applied. In the years since its
adoption, the meaning of the first amendment has been a constant
source of litigation, and it has undergone extensive scrutiny. The
result of these examinations is that the amendment, seemingly
written in uncategorical terms and in clear language, has been
limited in its application. The issues raised have dealt with defini-
tional problems: what constitutes "speech" for first amendment
purposes, and thus is accorded the constitutional protection
against "abridgement"? The best known and fully litigated excep-
tions to the privilege are in the obscenity area,2 and in the area
referred to as "words tending to a breach of the peace."3 This
article concerns another well-recognized exception-the area of
"commercial speech," one not nearly so old nor fully developed as
the two areas mentioned above, although one certainly becoming
an area of increasing interest.
In every instance where free and unhindered speech is allowed,
it must be borne in mind throughout that there are benefits accru-
ing to three sectors of society. The first sector to benefit is the
sector whose interest is being communicated, the "speaker". The
speaker has an obvious interest in having his point of view commu-
nicated to others, whether they be potential voters, citizens to be
recruited for a cause, or buyers in the marketplace, in which case
the speaker is often denominated "advertiser".
The second sector to benefit from the interchange is that per-
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Ex parte Jackson, 96
U.S. 727, 736-37 (1877).
1 See generally Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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son or persons to whom the speech is directed or who happens to
hear what is said, the "listener". Individuals have an interest in
receiving the communications of others because it aids in their
quest for knowledge about happenings around them-it aids in
fulfilling their need to be informed-and assists in their making
more knowledgeable and rational choices in the marketplace. 4
The benefits afforded to the first two groups lead to the fulfill-
ment of a still larger benefit for the third sector, society as a whole.
This is true for at least two reasons. First, the free exchange of
ideas leads to fuller consideration of the numerous facets on the
issue under discussion. This in turn leads to more informed conclu-
sions and to the best possible solutions; when one is more informed
he is more likely to use his best judgment. This has as its ultimate
result the benefit of society. Second, it seems that the backbone
of a democracy-where each has a hand in the governmental pro-
cess-is a well-informed populace. The only way to insure that
such a group exists is to provide for the freest and widest possible
access to an unbridled and unhindered press.'
There is no doubt that the restrictive reading of the first
amendment has significantly hindered access to the free flow of
ideas. The "commercial speech" doctrine had its origin in 1942
when the United States Supreme Court scrutinized a New York
City sanitary ordinance forbidding the distribution of handbills,
circulars or other advertising matter of a business and commercial
nature. While reiterating the general proposition that the freedom
of communicating information and disseminating opinion may not
unduly be burdened or proscribed in public thoroughfares, the
Court, in Valentine v. Chrestensen,I concluded that "the Constitu-
tion imposes no such restraint on governments as respects purely
commercial advertising."7 This statement has been interpreted to
mean that "purely commercial speech" is not entitled to any first
amendment protection,' and, for a great period of time, it seemed
J . MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. I (Norton 1975).
5 Id. at ch. II.
316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Id. at 54. The Court's lack of cited authority in making its determination has
brought wide criticism. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898,
905 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring opinion); Redish, The
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. lRv. 429, 450 (1971).
1 See Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DE-
PAUL L. REv. 1258, 1263-64 nn. 31 & 32 (1974).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss2/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
that no first amendment interests would be recognized if contained
within "purely commercial speech."
Normative political theory considers the idea of "free speech"
a value to be pursued as an end in itself. The goals to be achieved
by the unhindered interchange of ideas serve to benefit society as
a whole. Shown to be equally important will be the effects of
speech containing not political ideas, but commercial ones. The
implications of such a message upon both our political and eco-
nomic systems have been only recently recognized and will be
examined in the context of application of political theory to judi-
cial decisionmaking.
The holding in Chrestensen was presaged by a number of cases
involving not the substantive speech itself, but rather the mediums
through which the material was distributed. The medium has be-
come almost as important as the material itself. Before the Court
had considered the specific question of commercial leaflet distribu-
tion, several questions had arisen concerning the amount of regula-
tion which local governments could place upon the distribution of
handbills. Lovell v. Griffin,9 the first case in the area, went quite
clearly to the method of dissemination as it involved the regulation
of distributing hand-to-hand leaflets, handbills, circulars, or liter-
ature of any nature within the city limits. Lovell involved a Jeho-
vah's Witness who had failed to get the permission of the authori-
ties required under the statute. The Court held the ordinance in-
valid as a prior restraint. By examining the primary purpose of the
activity in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, the Court had no prob-
lem finding that the activity went beyond the excercise of purely
commercial speech and into the area of protected religious activ-
ity. 0
The next year, in Schneider v. State," the Court held that a
municipality's interests in cleanliness and the prevention of litter-
ing were not alone sufficient to sustain ordinances preventing the
distribution, either totally or with severe restrictions such as police
examinations, of handbills and other literature. In a series of three
cases, the Court found that the distribution of pamphlets in gen-
eral could not be hampered through their submission to police
L. REv. 1258, 1263-64 nn. 31 & 32 (1974).
303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938).
" Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142-43 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania.,
319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
1 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
[Vol. 79
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authorities whose duty it was to scrutinize the contents. The
Schneider Court for the first time looked to the content of the
literature. Whereas in Lovell the ordinance was invalidated be-
cause it swept too broadly, in Schneider the Court looked to the
very speech sought to be prohibited. Mr. Justice Roberts, later to
write for a unanimous Court in Chrestensen, stated that Schneider
was "not to be taken as holding that commercial soliciting and
canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation" as the fra-
mers of ordinances may require.12 This language needs to be carried
but one step before becoming the holding in Chrestensen. Judge
Jerome Frank, dissenting in Chrestensen, contended that where
there was no relationship between the commercial advertisement
and the political protest, "the dominant purpose . . .[,] his sole
purpose in trying to distribute the handbill. .. ", was commer-
cial. 3
The Chrestensen standard has become known as the "primary
purpose" or "motive" test. There the advertiser had attached to
the advertising leaflet in question a statement of protest against
the city, and contended the statement was no less protected be-
cause of the advertising. The Court rejected the distinction be-
tween public interests and private profit in favor of the intent with
which the act was done, 4 and explicitly refused to determine the
extent to which the statement of protest was protected.
In determining the degree to which Chrestensen's handbill
was to be given first amendment protections, the Court used two
lines of analysis, either of which would have led to the same result.
The Court first looked to the ordinance sought to be invalidated
and found that it was one which furthered a legitimate interest of
the state, while at the same time did not sweep so broadly as to
fail meeting constitutional muster." Additionally, the ordinance
fulfilled those other necessary prerequisites applicable to the regu-
lated media."
22 Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
23 122 F.2d. 511, 519 (2d Cir. 1941) (Frank, J., dissenting opinion).
1 [Tihe affixing of the protest against official conduct to the adver-
tising circular was with the intent, and for the purpose of evading the
prohibition of the ordinance.
316 U.S. at 55. See Redish, supra note 6, at 451; Note, Developments in the Law
- Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1005, 1028 (1967).
316 U.S. at 54.
"See Kaufman, The Medium, The Message and The First Amendment, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 774-75 (1970).
4
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The second line of analysis concerned the specific speech in-
volved with the Court going behind the printed pages to discover
the author's intent. Although the speech was within the specific
prohibitions of the ordinance, the Court found it to be otherwise
unprotected because the two statements "did no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction."'" Apparently out of a desire to
abstain from deciding a constitutional issue unless necessary, the
Court used only this second path, with the resulting confusion.
The most significant case to arise in the commercial speech
area over the next thirty years was New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan," in which the Court held a paid political advertisement
was entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as was
any other speech. The Court rejected the contention that the ad
was "purely commercial speech" within the context of
Chrestensen. The advertisement "communicated information,
expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses,
and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose exist-
ence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern. . . .That the Times was paid for publishing the adver-
tisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that
newspapers and books are sold."' 9
The Court's concern in this instance seemed to be that of
dissemination of ideas through the only outlet available and
marked the beginning of inquiry into the content, rather than the
primary purpose of the speech. This shifting of emphasis has con-
tinued to the point where the examining of the speech in question
on the basis of content has caused the Court to find first amend-
ment protections in otherwise commercial speech. Certain com-
mercial attributes alone do not necessarily cause speech to lose its
protected status.
Gaining recognition in the speech area are two interests of a
fundamental character. The first interest is that which individuals
have in expressing themselves-the concept of man as a social
animal. The individual's role in society often causes him to con-
sider it his duty to speak, whether out of fear or out of frustration,
on matters reflecting his interest in some vital particular. Man's
,1 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan].
" Id. at 266.
[Vol. 79
5
Thompson: Constitutional Law--Restricting the Application of the Commercial
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977
STUDENT NOTES
second interest in speech is somewhat akin to the first and is di-
rectly related to his societal role. Communication which is de-
signed to inform him of the decisions he must make in society
requires a protected speech which aids him in the process of formu-
lating governmental alternatives.
However, it is clear that not all speech is so fundamentally
important as to gain protected status. This is graphically demon-
strated in what may be the last case containing a viable "commer-
cial speech" doctrine, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commis-
sion on Human Relations.2" Pittsburgh Press involved a complaint
filed with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations by the
National Organization for Women, alleging that the sex-
designated help-wanted advertisement columns used by the Press
violated the Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh.
This ordinance provided that it was unlawful for any employer to
publish an advertisement indicating discrimination based on sex,
or for any reason to aid in such discrimination, unless the Commis-
sion had certified that sex was in fact a bona fide occupational
qualification. After a hearing, the Commission ordered the news-
paper to cease the classification on the basis of sex." The Press had
a disclaimer which preceded the columns in question, stating that
there were various laws and ordinances which prohibitied discrimi-
nation in hiring on the basis of sex and that the column arrange-
ment was for the convenience of the readers only.2 It must be
added that either the advertisers themselves designated into which
column the ads would be placed, or the Press would attempt to
ascertain into which column a given position belonged.? The posi-
tion of the Press was that the advertisements were protected
speech, as was the advertisement in Sullivan, and that the Press's
practice of exercising its editorial judgement in the use of the clas-
sification scheme raised it to the level of protected speech.'4
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, rejected both of
these contentions. The Court stated first that the mere fact that
speech appeared in the form of an advertisement was not, standing
alone, sufficient to make it commercial and, therefore, unpro-
tected." Nevertheless, this case was distinguished from Sullivan
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
2, Id. at 379-80.
2 Id. at 381 n.7.
2 Id. at 380 n.5.
24 Id. at 381.
2 Id. at 384.
6
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since here the advertisements did no more than "propose a com-
mercial transaction""6 in precisely the same fashion as did the
leaflet of Chrestensen. The Court further distingusihed this case
by highlighting the very nature of the material in Sullivan, the
social and political criticism which it raised on a vital social issue.
This crucial aspect of the material was missing in Pittsburgh Press
where no opinions were expressed, and no complaints of abuses
were made. Because of these deficiencies, the advertisements were
"classic examples of commercial speech."
In rejecting the argument of the Press as to the editorial judge-
ment allegedly used in the advertising process, the Court found
that the disclaimer and the classification scheme, together with
the advertisements themselves, constituted an "integrated com-
mercial statement." Furthermore, the Court explicitly pointed
out that the entire scheme would remain unprotected where the
activity itself (discrimination in employment) was illegal, and
where the Court could assume that the practices in which the Press
engaged furthered such activities, or, at the very least, aided the
employers themselves in the practicing of discriminatory activi-
ties.2 As the speech promoted an activity which was illegal, the
speech could be regulated on that ground alone, though the Court
never fully reached this issue." Chief Justice Burger in his dissent
questioned whether the Press was in fact engaging in continuing
criminal activity. 1
While adhering to the commercial speech analysis, the Court
utilized a balancing test in determining the relative values of the
conflicting interests involved. 2 The legislative social policy was
clearly based on the state interest of furthering the right to equal
access in employment which the Court determined to be para-
mount to the necessity of the free flow of ideas. The need for the
free dissemination of ideas was not present here, for there were no
"ideas" involved. Had the expression of opinions or ideas been
involved, the determination of commercial speech would never
2 Id. at 385.
2 Id.
28 Id. at 388.
21 Id. at 388-89.
11 Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 189-92 (1948). See also
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
3' 413 U.S. at 395 n.2.
3' Id. at 389.
[Vol. 79
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have been made, and a finding in this regard would have necessi-
tated the use of some alternative mode of analysis.
. In the event that the Court had failed to find the advertise-
ments of the Press to be "commercial speech," the Court could
have used the "speech-action" analysis in arriving at a similar
result. The activity may be viewed as a continuum, at one end of
which lies what the Court has referred to as "pure speech, '33 sub-
ject to no restriction of any kind by the state, and at the other end
of which lies "conduct," action subject to restriction by the state.34
While the discussion of ideas is, and should be protected, action,
depending upon its effect, may or may not be so protected. Where
the effect of the action would be the furthering of an illegal activ-
ity, such as job discrimination, the "action-speech" (some hybrid
or combination of both speech and action and lying at some point
midway in the continuum) would not be protected. It is possible
also that the Court could have decided the case on the issue of
"action" through another mechanism. Because the newspaper de-
cided whether it would allow the advertiser to select the column,
it was contended by the Press that it exercised editorial discretion
in determining where the advertisements were to be placed. The
Commission found, however, that in every case the Press deferred
to the judgement of the advertiser. The Court nonetheless consid-
ered the issue of editorial discretion by determining that in some
circumstances "a newspaper's editorial judgements . . . take on
the character of the advertisement and, in those cases, the scope
of the newspaper's first amendment protection may be affected by
13Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech
and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction .... Once the
speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct which amounts to
more than the right of free discussion comprehends,. . . he enters a realm
where a reasonable ... requirement may be imposed.
Id. at 540.
N Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who
would communicate ideas by conduct ... as these amendments afford
to those who communicate ideas by pure speech .... We reaffirm the
statement of the Court ... that "it has never been deemed an abridge-
ment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written or printed."
Id. at 555.
8
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the content of the advertisement."3 This editorial-commercial di-
chotomy is justifiable solely on the theory that the first amend-
ment values political propaganda more than that of a trade nature,
although this distinction is nowhere expressed in the Constitution.
It has been contended that "[t]he Constitution does not discrimi-
nate between different liberties. It leaves all liberties to compete
for men's allegiance in a free field. In that competition the sales-
man has the same opportunity as the preacher, the scientist, the
engineer, the soldier, and the politician ... "I'
Through the exercise of its editorial discretion, the newspaper
may allow itself to become so inextricably involved in the discrimi-
nation-hence, action-that the speech is not protected. " This is
the rationale for the Court's conclusion that the combination is
"an integrated commercial statement."3 s Inferentially, if the ad-
vertisement fulfilled the Sullivan requirements," then the adver-
tisement would become not "purely commercial speech," but
"protected speech" within the contemplation of the first amend-
ment.
The Press's problem was that it furthered discrimination
through the use of its advertisements. Had the Press advocated its
views on the matter in some manner more consistent with the
Court's holding in Sullivan, rather than implement or practice its
views, then the Court would have had difficulty finding a further-
ing of discriminatory hiring practices by the newspaper itself, and
may even have found the activity to have been protected. Here the
disclaimer was such that the Court found it insignificant as an
editorial statement. In no instance, however, could the Press have
continued to print its advertising pages in such a manner as to
further the unlawful hiring practices of its advertisers, though on
413 U.S. at 386.
3' Gardner, Free Speech in Public Places, 36 BOST. L. REv. 239, 246-47 (1956).
This concept has been a popular one over the years, having such notable advocates
as Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). "[T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas- . the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market. . . ." Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting opinion). Recent decisions indicate
the concept to be growing in popularity. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-26
(1975); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
3 413 U.S. at 386; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 281
(1964).
11 413 U.S. at 388.
31 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
[Vol. 79
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each page of the ads it could print an editorial decrying\equal
opportunity and sex-less hiring. The distinction is obvious: we can
say virtually all we want, we just cannot do the same.
The Court in Pittsburgh Press appears to have adopted as its
basic tenet the "self-government" principle of first amendment
theory espoused by Professor Alexander MeiklejohnA' Meikle-
john's contention is that where speech exists which is relevant to
the decisions which a citizen must make in order to fulfill his role
in the governmental scheme, the speech is absolutely protected
from any interference by the state.
4
'
Meiklejohn has never contended that the "self-government"
principle absolutely protects a speaker's right to speak at any time,
in any manner, or in any place. His view accepts any laws or
ordinances requiring the speaker to conform to the necessities of
the community, so long as the restrictions are not subterfuges by
which the government attempts to suppress speech of "governing
importance."" Under this analysis, the government has at least
some power to regulate speech, protected or unprotected, in both
manner and place. Such a reservation of power is reflected in the
view of the "absolutists", those who believe that the first amend-
ment absolutely prohibits Congress from making laws abridging
the freedoms contained therein, and, as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, imposes an identical restric-
tion upon the state governments. 3 Though the speech falls within
the purview of the first amendment, it is the collateral aspects of
the speech which fall beyond the scope of the amendment, and it
is this aspect of speech, if any, which the government may regulate
or suppress. It is when these collateral aspects come under consid-
10 Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245,
256-57 (1961).
1' In my view, "the people need free speech" because they have
decided, in adopting, maintaining and interpreting their Constitution, to
govern themselves rather than to be governed by others. And, in order to
make that self-government a reality rather than an illusion, in order so
that it may become as wise and effective as its responsibilities require,
the judgement-making of the people must be self-educated in the ways
of freedom. That is, I think, the positive purpose to which the negative
words of the First Amendment gave a constitutional expression.
Id. at 263.
42 Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. lEv. 1, 13 (1965).
11 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 578 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting opinion).
10
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eration that litigation arises over whether the regulation is or is not
unduly broad, burdensome or restrictive.
The "absolutist" view has never commanded a majority of the
Court, and the prevailing view is itself constantly in flux." The
Court has, from time to time, explicitly held that first amendment
rights are not absolute and, in the area of speech, are based pri-
marily on the theory that the first amendment is intended to pro-
tect the discussion of public issues. 5 This holding was reiterated
in Pittsburgh Press, although questioned by Mr. Justice Douglas
in his dissent."6 Douglas however, seems to have miscontrued the
holding of the Court as imposing some restrictions upon the ability
of the press in general to criticize upon the basis of political creed
or unjust rule of law. While reiterating his frequent stand against
the holding in Chrestensen, Douglas attempted to demonstrate the
unjustness inherent in the case by posing an issue falling not
within the limits of Chrestensen, but instead clearly within the
holding in Sullivan. However, he, too, explicitly recognized the
Meiklejohn philosophy-a first amendment based upon a free-
wheeling, independent people, whose Jeffersonian philosophy
marks expression to action as the point of permissible government
intrusion, and whose speech contains knowledge, a search for
truth, and an intellectual curiosity serving the general welfare.47
This concept was further elucidated in Bigelow v. Virginia,'
and seems now to be the dominant philosophy within the Court.
Appellant Bigelow was a director and the managing editor of a
newspaper with local circulation, particularly on the campus of the
nearby University of Virginia. On the day he was directly responsi-
ble for the content, publication and circulation of the paper, an
advertisement in the weekly by an organization in New York City
announced that arrangements could be made through them to ob-
tain abortion placements in low-cost, accredited hospitals and
clinics in New York. The advertisement informed readers that
abortions were legal in New York State, and that there were no
residency requirements. According to the ad, the entire procedure
was to be done in strictest confidence, and the organization would
" Brennan, supra note 42, at 4-7.
" Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 nn.2 & 3 (1942).
413 U.S. at 398-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
' Id. at 399; ManKIzoHN, PoUTcAL FRnzam 42 (Oxford 1965).
4, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
[Vol. 79
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offer interested parties information and counseling, as well as
make all the necessary arrangements. Bigelow was charged with
and convicted of violating a Virginia statute which prohibited ad-
vertising or publishing materials which encouraged the procuring
of abortions. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected Bi-
gelow's claim that the ad was merely informational and found that
it "constituted an offer to perform a service."" The ad was consid-
ered commercial speech which may constitutionally be prohibited
by the state" as a valid exercise of police power. 1 The Virginia
court reconsidered in light of the decisions in Roe v. Wade" and
Doe v. Bolton,53 which made the right to procure an abortion a
"fundamental right." Nevertheless, the court affirmed, 4 .noting
that neither Roe and Doe "mentioned the subject of abortion ad-
vertising" and finding nothing in those decisions "which in any
way" affected their earlier view. 5
In reversing Bigelow's conviction on first amendment grounds,
Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, looked to the facts
involved in Chrestensen, Sullivan and Pittsburgh Press. The Court
found more in the Bigelow ad than the mere propositioning for a
commercial transaction. Looking to its earlier opinion in Sullivan
to find a matter of "public interest and concern", the Court found
that portions of the Bigelow ad involved other rights rooted in the
first amendment as interpreted by Sullivan, namely that of com-
municating information and expressing opinion. 6 This need for
information and opinion so highly regarded by the Court is rooted
in the Meiklejohn philosophy as the way for the governing popu-
lace to achieve its objective of self-government; it is the keystone
of a viable democratic system. The holding, narrowly construed,
is compatable with Chrestensen, as there was no attempt to evade
a state or local regulation by trick or ruse using otherwise protected
speech in an attempt to raise otherwise unprotected speech to a
protected level. In this regard, the holding conforms also to the
guidelines of Sullivan.7
49 213 Va. 191, 193, 191 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1972).
"1 Id. at 193-95, 191 S.E.2d at 174-76.
51 Id. at 196, 191 S.E.2d at 176.
52 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
51 214 Va. 341, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973).
" Id. at 342, 200 S.E.2d at 680.
51 421 U.S. at 822; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964).
11 376 U.S. at 266.
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss2/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
However, in Bigelow, the Court applied the Meiklejohn phi-
losophy in a way in which it was not designed to be used. The
Court implied that the right to the free flow of information was
simply one of the factors to be considered in a weighing of various
interests, without giving any indication as to the relative weight
to be assigned to the right. The Court reiterated the balancing test
alluded to in Pittsbugh Press,8 although it seems to have made it
a test which is not only flexible and difficult to administer, but also
one which would be imprecise and unpredictable. Such uncer-
tainty could easily result in a chilling effect where speech of a
questionable nature is involved.59 The Court has previously held
that the mere existence of vague or overbroad statutes can create
such an effect, irrespective of the manner in which they may be
applied," and yet it appears to be this vague balancing test which
is being adopted by the Court. The Court must be continually on
guard to ensure stifling effects of the balancing test upon the press,
for material falling within the zone of uncertainty will not, in all
probability, be published for fear of criminal sanctions. This is
analagous to the chilling effect so eschewed by the Court in the
civil damage cases." The imposition of a rule such as this would
result in a form of "self-censorship" as effective as any statute
enacted by any legislative body, even in those instances where the
would-be speaker believes the speech is of public importance. The
ultimate result of such a rule is that it "dampens the vigor and
limits the variety of public debate," something which would be, in
the judgement of the Court, an unconscionable result.2
Bigelow signalled the final blow to any semblance of a viable
"commercial speech" doctrine. Any lingering doubts were dis-
See text accompanying note 32 supra.
5' Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing opinion). The term "chilling effect" is used to indicate a situation where would-
be critics are deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be
true and even though it is in fact true, because of uncertainty in the facts, because
of doubt whether it can be proved in court, or because of fear of the expense of
having to do so. Such a situation breeds timidity and inhibits the expression of
ideas. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
11 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
11 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 360 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting opinion); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 279 (1964).
2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1964).
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pelled in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,,, involving a state statute which cited as
unprofessional conduct the advertising of the prices of prescription
drugs in any manner. Any pharmacist who was found by the Board
to be guilty of unprofessional conduct was subject to a fine or to
forfeiture of his license to practice. Challenge to the statute was
made by citizens who frequently purchased prescription drugs and
citizens groups. They alleged that the statute prevented them from
making purchases of prescription drugs to their best advantage
because they were unable to ascertain the prices of the drugs in
advance of making their purchases. The Board contended that the
ban on advertising was necessary in order to maintain high profes-
sional standards; they feared a number of pharmacists would ad-
vertise the marketing of inferior, low-cost products without denom-
inating them as such, that many persons would unwittingly pur-
chase such products, and hence the reputable pharmacists, who
only market more expensive and superior products, would be
driven out of business. The Court found this to be unpersuasive
because the effects of any such misleading advertisements could
be countered by advertisements from the reputable pharmaceuti-
cal dealers pointing out the true state of facts." Thus, as discussed
above," the "marketplace" concept seems very much alive in
speech-advertising analysis.
The Court has found it necessary to move from its initial
position in viewing the considered material to one which places the
emphasis upon the speech instead of the speaker. In order to
achieve this change, the Court made the determination that the
freedom of speech reflected in the first amendment is that which
presupposes the right to "receive information and ideas." 6 Limita-
tions upon the exercise of the first amendment freedom of speech
infringe upon the intended recipients of the ideas or thoughts,
indeed, even upon the words themselves, 7 with the inevitable con-
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
" Id. at 1829.
" See text accompanying note 36 supra.
" Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (hardship imposed on
prisoner's correspondence because of prison censorship; first amendment rights of
"outsiders" not to be abridged by unjustified governmental intrusion). See also
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (interviews by media represent-
atives of specifically designated inmates prohibited for fear of disciplinary and
moral problems; other sources of information can be utilized although with greater
14
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clusion that the right rests more in the listener to hear than in the
speaker to speak. 8
The Court has seized upon the public interest inherent in any
advertising by pointing out that "[a]dvertising, however tasteless
and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemina-
tion of information,"" regardless of how minimal. For the Court to
make such a statement it was necessary to place all advertising on
an equal footing. No additional protection was to be accorded ad-
vertising which was of a "public interest," for indeed, under such
circumstances all advertising would be of a public interest. The
end desired was that of a well informed and intelligent populace,
and the means to such an end was through the dissemination of
the greatest amount of information possible.
We may examine the rationale of the Court through two meth-
ods. First, we may consider the idea of the marketplace, referring
to the marketplace where products are bought and sold as com-
modities and not to the marketplace where there is a free exchange
of ideas. If we are so willing to allow the proponents of unpopular,
even radical and dangerous views to tender them forth, knowing
full well that the intention of the proponents is to seek their adop-
tion, then it seems absurd to restrain competitors from advertising
and espousing the virtues of their products and services in an eco-
nomic system which depends upon the unhindered and unregu-
lated flow of goods for its vitality.70
Secondly, we may examine the result in the context of the
political forum. If the purpose of the first amendment is to aid in
the political process, the freedoms guaranteed under its provisions
are designed for aiding in the scheme of government, and once
again no rational distinction can be made between political and
economic advertising. In election years we are bombarded with
political advertising of all types, that which appeals to our intellect
and that which insults it. On these bases we make our political
decisions. When we enter into "purely commercial transactions,"
we do so on the basis of advertisements which appeal to or insult
difficulty); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (first amendment rights of prison-
ers may be balanced against interest of authorities in internal security).
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390, 392-95 (1969).
96 S. Ct. at 1827.
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our intellect.7 ' Speaking in economic terms only, the commercial
transactions we enter into are sizeable. When we purchase goods,
we are casting our economic "votes," in terms of dollars, towards
that product which has impressed us most favorably, just as we do
when we choose candidates for public office.
In both of these situations the rationale is the same. Both in
the economic and political schemes we rely on information which
is designed to assist in the individual decision-making process.
Just as we require a free flow of information regarding the political
process because we value the concept of political self-realization,
so too should we require an open exchange of ideas and information
in the economic framework to provide for a more satisfying per-
sonal life. 2 To achieve truly the aims we have established necessi-
tates the fullest possible flow of information to the decisions to be
made.
Even if the Court was to assume that the first amendment was
designed as an aid to the democratic system, it felt there could be
elements contained in advertising which may serve that goal. In-
formation is what is "indispensable to the formulation of intelli-
gent opinions"73 as to how our free enterprise system ought to be
regulated to provide proper allocation of our scarce resources. Inas-
much as our economic system is inextricably intertwined with our
political system, any information aiding one affects, albeit indi-
rectly, the other. Hence, such information should be accorded con-
stitutional protection.74 The Court arrived at such a conclusion
after making explicit that the case involved speech which, under
past circumstances, would have otherwise been unprotected.
The Court found, however, that there was nothing in the first
amendment history to indicate that it was designed to protect
1, Comment, Advertising Food and Drugs: Concealing a Truth, Hinting a Lie,
8 AKRON L. REV. 456 (1975).
7 Redish, supra note 6 at 445-46.
11 96 S. Ct. at 1827.
71 C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRErATIoN OF THE CONSTrTION OF THE UNITED
STATEs (Free Press 1965); E. SELIGMAN, THE ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY
(Columbia 1949).
11 Our question is whether speech which does "no more than propose
a commercial transaction," . . . is so removed from any "exposition of
ideas," . . . and from "'truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in
its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of government,'"
that it lacks all protection.
96 S. Ct. at 1826.
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interests of every nature but economic. Looking at circumstances
in which the interests involved were of an entirely private and
economic character, the Court found instances in which the protec-
tion of the first amendment had been accorded. Discussion which
has as its end merely the influencing of outcome was protected
even though the parties did not venture outside of the narrow
confines of their dispute or discussion."
In two respects the Court's opinion in Virginia Pharmacy is
somewhat puzzling. The Court states that it is holding that
"purely commercial speech" is to be guaranteed the same constitu-
tional protections assured speech of otherwise political import-
ance. They have thus impliedly overruled the prior holding in
Chrestensen without doing so in a clear and unambiguous fashion.
The Court also rules that "[i]f there is a kind of commercial
speech that lacks all First Amendment protection therefore, it
must be distinguished by its content."7 Further reading of the
opinion reveals, however, that permissible restrictions can be
made regarding the time, place, and manner of distribution of
commercial speech.7 These are restrictions which clearly do not go
to the content of the material, but rather go to the distributive
process. It is possible that the second issue, the distributive pro-
cess, is what prevented the Court from overruling Chrestensen
outright, because Chrestensen was a case involving leaflet distri-
bution. The Court does point out that there are certain safeguards
which must be met where such restrictions exist. If they are to be
upheld, such restrictions must be justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, must serve a significant govern-
mental interest, and must leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information." The broad holding in
Virginia Pharmacy seems to revitalize the older line of cases allow-
ing regulation of the advertising mediums."
Where regulations regarding commercial speech are involved,
it would appear that they will be upheld in certain instances where
content itself is regulated. Where the information conveyed is false
and misleading, the message itself may be regulated solely in terms
76 Id.
7 Id. at 1825.
78 Id. at 1830.
' Id.
See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra. See also Note, Freedom of Expres-
sion in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 1191, 1199-1203 (1965).
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of due process.8 ' As contrasted to speech of a political, social, or
religious nature, fraudulent or misleading advertising is not pro-
tected by the first amendment."' It has been contended that
Sullivan does not protect statements in advertising which are
made with knowledge of their inaccuracy. Conscious or intentional
falsity does not seem to be protected. 3 However, there has been
language to the effect that where advertising is itself misleading,
then the intention with which the ad was published is irrelevant.
8 4
That no protection may be accorded deceptive advertising is re-
flected in both Bigelow 5 and Virginia Pharmacy,88 and indeed
some contend that speech of an untruthful nature is not at all
protected."
Where the product is one which is or could be withdrawn from
the market, or the service is one which could be curtailed by gov-
ernment regulation, then presumably the advertising itself can be
regulated or perhaps even prohibited. Where the product is banned
or withdrawn, then there is no reason why the advertising itself
should not likewise be proscribable, since the power to prohibit
sale or use necessarily implies the power to prohibit the advertising
for it.8" Where the product or service is available, information
about it is valuable to potential consumers, and advertising about
it should be in the protected category.8"
The approach which it is hoped the Court will take is a test
similar to that enunciated in Sullivan, where the Court looked to
the need to advance society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate on public issues. This may be something of a
"public interest" test, where information of a public interest is
1, E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1955) (a legitimate
end which is reasonably related to the means employed); Semler v. Oregon State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105
(1932).
82 Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 191 (1948).
Redish, supra note 6, at 459.
84 Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 189-90 (1948).
'3 421 U.S. at 827-28.
96 S.Ct. at 1830-31.
' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961).
11 See Lydick, State Control of Liquor Advertising Under the United States
Constitution, 12 BAYLOR L. REV. 43, 43-45 (1960).
1, See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
1191, 1196 (1965).
"3 376 U.S. at 270.
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protected from normal governmental intrusion by the first amend-
ment.' While the Court has all but explicitly rejected such an
approach in the obscenity area,92 this is the approach which could
be utilized best in the commercial speech area,93 since all speech,
regardless of type, is measured against a public interest standard.
The Court has determined that the public interest is not served by
actionable words, slander, libel or other defamatory words, or ob-
scene materials.
Under this approach, the Court will be forced to administer a
vague test in attempting to determine what is and is not in the
public interest. It is quite likely that a vast number of cases will
be submitted for review. The standards are as yet undefined, for
the Court must in every instance attempt to ascertain just what is
the "public interest". The second step is to measure the speech
sought to be regulated against the public interest, to determine
whether or not it furthers the public interest. However, this is
based solely upon a determination that the regulation involved
inhibits the speech itself and not its distributive channels. Where
the regulation goes only to the distribution process in some way,
only due process restrictions must be met.
The principles of the first amendment have value to society
wholly separate and apart from the protective functions normally
associated with them. The first amendment serves to protect the
political principles we hold dear. The potential is there, however,
for the political protections of the first amendment to be expanded
to encompass other interests of society. We have seen how this has
been applied to protect economic considerations. In so doing, the
Court is reading the first amendment less restrictively than ever
before and with the apparent likelihood of other diverse interests
being recognized and accorded protection.
Stephen Lee Thompson
" Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing opinion).
92 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
'3 See Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAV. L.
REv. 1005, 1029-34 (1967).
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